


PHILOSOPHY,
RELIGION AND
EDUCATION

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion



Europe's Crisis and America's Dilemma

As autumn unfolded, Europe's mood was one of self-assurance bordering on complacency. As in the United States, peace and prosperity prevailed. Economic recovery carried with it new awareness of national independence. Nations like France and Britain whose postwar policies have often been subordinated to American programs visibly stirred and asserted their sovereign rights on matters like the fulfillment of rearmament pledges or other commitments. Neutralism reared its head even in proposals like Chancellor Adenauer's call for a united Europe capable of standing once more upon its own feet in a world threatening to pass it by. A speaker on the BBC Third Programme predicted "it is no longer so foolish . . . to think of Western Europe as a potential Third Force." The sense of utter dependence upon the United States was replaced by new freedom and a consciousness of not inconsiderable national achievements. Someone observed that Europeans were acting more like Americans.

This spirit made itself felt no less in a country like Austria than in Britain. Austrian recovery was impressive alone in material terms. Shops were filled with goods, consumers crowded the streets, and proud Viennese flocked through the portals of their beloved Opera. Ironically, increased production stemmed largely from industries born during wartime

and the Occupation. But technical developments alone could hardly have brought about the Austrian renaissance. We might observe that freedom for young Americans, who have never known the oppressor's heel, too often is little more than a verbalism found in every politician's bag of tricks, made of "sound and fury, signifying nothing." Austria in October, 1956, put flesh and blood on the concept. Viennese during the Occupation were passive, apathetic and resigned to an uncertain fate. Students were alternately anxious and indifferent, fearful and fatalist in their outlook. Then came freedom and national independence and with it the inspiration to rediscover both the gaiety of life and a noble yet plausible national purpose. Austria became a window to the East. Its attainments were self-consciously on display for the enslaved satellite peoples. Even before the Hungarian revolt, a small but steady stream of eastern European intellectuals crossed the borders. Austrians through independence recovered their dignity and with it new resources of energy, ambition and pride. These spiritual resources overshadowed all else. For example, in 1954 Austrian friends had told me, "we can do this or that for freedom if we have American support." In 1956 they announced, "We are doing this. Will America help?" If anyone doubts this transformation, he need only

This Issue: Foreign Policy Discussion—

Foreign policy issues today, especially in relation to the Middle East, divide those who usually agree on social questions. Many liberal Democrats in this country are now closer to British Conservatives than they are to the leaders of the Labor Party, and the latter suddenly discover themselves somewhere near President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. Usually we can predict what our friends will think about an issue if we know their general point of view—but not in the present situation. The Editorial Board of this journal finds itself in surprising disagreements. Therefore, instead of taking a single editorial position, we are publishing a major article by Kenneth W. Thompson, one of our Contributing Editors, who has recently returned from Europe, and we are adding several comments which bring out some of the points of divergence. We invite our readers to participate in the discussion. We hope to publish a number of brief letters in an early issue.

THE EDITORS

Vol. XVI, No. 23 January 7, 1957 \$3.00 per year; 15 cents per copy
181

look to Austria at this moment boldly shouldering the burdens of Hungarian refugees. Here is a case where unquenchable fires burn in the breasts of those who seek and those who give haven. Perhaps that is why a population of 7,000,000 is trying to house and feed 100,000 *Ungarnfluchtlinge* (refugees) while larger powers until recently have done much less.

But to return to early October, Europe's crisis, paradoxically enough, has its roots in a recovery of national identity throughout Europe. For nearly a decade the postwar "Grand Alliance" between Europe and America was founded on mutual or identical interests. Europe's recovery and its security were guaranteed by American power. Its recovery stemmed from the Marshall Plan; its security resulted ultimately from our atomic monopoly. In this context it mattered little that certain concrete European interests in Asia and the Near East were sometimes at odds with America's interests. Economic, political and military necessity dictated that Europe stand with the United States or invite catastrophe and possibly national suicide. Then European economic recovery and the withdrawal of Marshall aid undermined the first pillar of this concert of power. The Russian explosion of an atomic bomb shattered the other pillar. Now Europe, far from being reassured by our stockpile of bombs, trembles at the thought of being pulverized by total weapons from one side or the other. Notwithstanding these changes, bonds of community and mutual interest might have sustained the coalition had statesmen like Churchill remained in power. Wounds might have been assuaged, differences could have been healed and the alliance patched up or kept intact if diplomatic communication had not broken down. However, the West lacked one firm, clear voice to interpret the actions of its members to one another. Instead of making the best of a changing situation, adapting to it and reinterpreting it, the allies allowed mutual understanding to be frittered away. Then, as James Reston points out, they "lost control of events."

Defacing the Communist Image

The most heartbreaking feature of the decline of the Western alliance is the fact that it coincided with the eruption of the Soviet empire. Events in Poland and Hungary had a far-reaching impact within Europe. They proved that unity of purpose in the East can no longer be taken for granted even

under the shadow of the Red Army. On November 3, *The Economist* observed: "By swift changes, the consequences of which are still incalculable, the peoples of eastern Europe have ceased to be mere pawns on the political chessboard." Poland revolted for "Bread and Freedom," gained a new leader who symbolically had once been imprisoned for his "nationalist" tendencies, dismissed the Russian General Rokossovsky as Minister of Defense and installed a national Communist regime. It was nationalist sentiment again that fanned the flames of revolt in Hungary but Hungarians were unwilling or unable to accept a Titoist solution. This illustrates the immense variety of the human family and the fallacy of speaking in general terms of eastern Europe any more than one can speak of Asia or Africa. Moreover, while demands for greater economic abundance were crucial in Poland, the physical condition of most Hungarian refugees would suggest that economic grievances were probably not central to their revolt. Hence the Marxist assumption that a solution of economic problems will satisfy all human needs is seen once more for what it is, a fantastic illusion.

It is still too early even to attempt to calculate the historic effects of these eruptions. No one can say whether they foreshadow a general upheaval in eastern Europe. Will eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia or some other satellite follow the Polish lead? Or will Hungarian aspirations for liberty and free elections prove contagious? Will the Russians seek by naked force to preserve complete domination within their sphere of influence? Or has the movement of liberalization arising from Khrushchev's journey away from Stalinism attained such momentum that there can be no turning back? Will the Russians eventually be forced to accept total withdrawal from eastern Europe as part of a more general political settlement? Or will their eternal fear of a band of partly independent states on their borders drive them to repeated acts of military oppression? Who would be bold enough to say? Who can predict?

Experienced European observers are as uncertain and divided as Americans. But on two points there is some consensus. First, the new Russian leadership vastly underestimated the force of national feeling. Second, Moscow's spiritual role as the Rome of the Communist world has been profoundly shaken, perhaps beyond repair. On the one hand, throughout Europe, the Socialist left has suffered from what cannot but be a far-reaching disenchantment with Communist mythology. In Italy the organ of the Nenni

Socialists, *Avanti*, repudiated claims that Fascist elements inspired the Hungarian revolt. The Communist line for once carried no conviction for the non-Communist left. On the other hand, Communist parties as such were substantially weakened. Everywhere in Europe I watched throngs of students and workers gathering to demonstrate against brutalities in Hungary, and in Milan a great mass meeting burned Communist banners and party leaders in effigy in the cathedral square. Nor was a single voice raised in protest. An Italian friend remarked this would not have been imaginable a few years before. When he went on to assert that the Italian Communist Party was dead, he may have been overly sanguine, yet clearly something profoundly significant has happened within Europe to the Communist image.

It would be comforting if one could add that all this has redounded to the credit of the United States. Unhappily this is not so. Many Europeans lament the fact that our protest on Hungary was not more prompt and decisive. They contrast it with the timing of declarations against Franco-British action in Egypt. Beyond this there is a rather cruel European anecdote about an Austrian and an Hungarian. The Austrian asks who is most hated in Hungary. The reply: The Russians and the Americans. Why? The Russians for what they did, the Americans for what they promised but failed to do. Probably not all refugees share this extreme view; yet the tragic irony of the doctrine of liberation may be that whereas it has kept alive hopes of a better day, it may also unwittingly have inspired illusions that America was willing and able to do more than it could possibly do within the Soviet orbit.

Egypt and "The Path of Honor"

If America's stock did not soar as a result of our responses to events in Hungary, the same is only partly true vis-a-vis Egypt. At first blush most Europeans outside France and perhaps England, felt with the President that Americans were walking "the path of honor alone." Charges of colonialism and imperialism were leveled against the French and British nearly as vehemently by Europeans as by Asians. Italians were quick to lay bare the hypocrisy of Europeans like Prime Minister Eden who had condemned Italian aggression in Ethiopia and now defended the invasion of Egypt. Public opinion in those first days ran overwhelmingly against "the self-appointed policemen." Their action was illegal and immoral, ill considered, ill timed (especially in light of Hungary) and, perhaps worst of all, poor-

ly executed. Yet there was ambivalence at an early stage. Some Italians added that had they been allowed to retain control of African territories such as Libya, Italy might have stood shoulder to shoulder with the French and British, assuring effective action. Indeed it was not primarily on abstract grounds of aggression or imperialism that French and British policy was most vigorously and successfully attacked. Rather, and to paraphrase, the indictment was that this was an unwise policy using the wrong pretext, executed in the wrong way and staged with incredibly poor timing. Why had the French not used Egyptian intervention in Algeria as a pretext? Why the delay in moving forces from Cyprus? Why not earlier or later? What was the prime motive for this gambler's throw? Was it to spite Mr. Dulles, to overthrow Nasser, to open the Canal, or to effect a collusion with Israel? Was it an act of spleen?

It looked for a time as if the American position on the crisis would give us a most substantial dividend of prestige and moral credit. Perhaps if we had been less virtuous in our claims we might have benefited more. However, the endless complexity of international conflicts leads many Europeans to suspect that there was more to the clash than naked aggression against an innocent and law-abiding country. The moralistic-legalistic character of American representations lead to a certain revulsion strengthened by existing antipathy toward certain American officials. Announcements in the European daily press of available oil reserves were sober reminders that vital interests were indeed at stake in Suez. More important, the successive disclosures of the presence of Soviet troops and technicians in Sinai and Syria (never fully confirmed or denied) overshadowed attention to legal niceties. Europeans who in the past had condemned American preoccupation with the Russian threat were now lecturing us on the growing threat of Soviet expansion into the Middle East. Since neither the United Nations nor the United States had been willing or able to resist these advances, France and England by intervening had arrested further expansion. Finally a note of cynicism crept into the thinking of some of our European friends. Could it be that our moral exuberance cloaked the advance of American business interests into former French and British spheres? One distinguished French analyst suggested privately that France had been left with but one alternative. It must leave North Africa to the Americans who might then more fully perceive the weight of problems in that area. The United States was one of the two super-powers, but would it be

able to shoulder all the burdens its allies had formerly carried and continue to bear its own as well?

Devotion, Patience and Moral Realism

Several lessons emerge from the painful and complicated crisis of Europe. One is that the Western alliance (the cornerstone of the free world's security) cannot be sustained without devotion, patience and effort. No longer can it be taken for granted—if it ever could. One factor in preserving it is the matter of style. When Prime Minister Churchill at the time of the Korean crisis was baited by Laborite back-benchers to denounce American and United Nations strategy in crossing the thirty-eighth parallel, he replied that his views on the Far Eastern question were well known. However, the preservation of the Anglo-American alliance as the keystone of Britain's security overshadowed all else. Therefore he chose to avoid a rancorous debate with his American ally even though Britain's interests were involved. Moderation and restraint were his guides.

Another lesson is that we have perhaps accepted too readily a conception of international politics that views choices in foreign policy as clear-cut moral alternatives. In the present crisis we emphatically denounced aggression and were adamant about any compromises with broad moral judgments. For example, we opposed the Belgian Resolution which called in a more temperate spirit for the withdrawal of French, British and Israeli troops. We do well to remind ourselves that if foreign policy could be founded exclusively on moral judgment without reference to the realities of strategy and vital interests, justice would require that we intervene militarily to turn back the Russians in Budapest. Seen in terms of humanity and justice, in one sense we are all cowards for refusing to share the fate of the Hungarian martyrs. Unhappily Hungary falls within the present Russian orbit and American intervention militarily would probably be a *casus belli* for the Soviet Union. Some of the Administration's reflections on the problem which are so dramatically at odds with earlier pronouncements on liberation throw a clear shaft of light on this reality. In his first speech as Secretary of State in 1953, Mr. Dulles announced: "To all those suffering under Communist slavery... let us say, 'You can count on us.'" Contrast this with the blunt realism of Mr. Nixon's recent words concerning Hungary: "Our only weapon here was moral condemnation, since the alternative was action on our part which might initiate the third and ultimate war." The former promised too much, but it may be that the latter, by publicly

renouncing our claims and conceding that we could do nothing (at a time when the Russians had threatened to intervene in the Middle East), went to an opposite extreme.

Two Approaches and Morality

Of all the issues that divide us, none is so all-pervasive as the clash between two approaches. One has its greatest currency in Britain and Europe, the other is characteristically American. The former offends by its tendency to give short shrift to abstract moral principles; the other falls prey to moral pretensions by assuming that states are more virtuous than they are. It is significant that the more intelligent Europeans denounced the Suez adventure not because military intervention is wrong everywhere and at all times. Rather they maintained that this particular gamble was not worth the prize. They preferred to indict present policy-makers on grounds of a pragmatic, not an absolute test. We frequently say that Western nations enjoy a common heritage, speak a common language, have inherited a common system of law, share much the same political philosophy, and recognize certain ideals of life transcending national boundaries. These unities, however, have not been sufficient to bind, say, London and Washington, together when there were differences over concrete measures of the means of attaining common ends or on their interests in various parts of the world. And contention over means has its roots in the divergence of basic approaches to the facts of international life.

The American approach is of course not a seamless web. Yet running through much of our foreign relations is the red thread of a sharply rationalistic-legalistic-moralistic approach. On the one hand, we are incurably children of the Enlightenment. We seek as the goal of "mature minds," the certainty of orderly patterns, unequivocal choices and predictable processes. We continually view the world through bifocal lenses that see only two alternatives. States are aggressive or peace-loving, policies are internationalist or isolationist and nations are said to be colonial or anti-colonial in their sympathies. The simple rationalism inherent in much of Western thinking since the French Revolution is compounded by another ingredient unique to the American world view. Christian sectarian thought has felt impelled to picture political action in terms of radically simple moral absolutes. Peace, anti-colonialism and the United Nations currently are invested with absolute ethical value. They are the new triad of international values which have become the American standard against which we are

asked to judge every event. For many of our leaders—secular and spiritual—these values provide a comfortable substitute for discriminate moral and political judgments. They comprise the new creed of a crusading, conservative political and religious movement.

Endless Complexities . . .

Significantly the promptness of our denunciation of our allies in Egypt as contrasted with the delay of our response in Hungary points up the perplexities of this approach. The goals of peace and of devotion to the United Nations happened to coincide in Egypt, and, while support for Nasser is a puzzling symbol of anti-colonialism, the fact that powers like France and Britain had intervened gave a superficially plausible character to the argument that colonialism was being resisted in the Middle East. In Hungary, however, Soviet colonialism-imperialism coupled with United Nations feelings dictated a vigorous Western policy; the immediate pathway to peace, however, demanded a policy of military neutrality which we in fact adopted. The endless complexities of international politics play havoc with every attempt to erect a proximate goal into the ultimate aim of our foreign relations. For instance, peace has become the consuming goal of foreign policy, and yet we must concede that today, as in the past, peace is attainable only by risking war. Never has American foreign policy been more poorly prepared to cope with this reality, for by committing ourselves to a policy of massive retaliation we are paralyzed to deal with situations of limited war in which neither we nor our foes can risk the use of retaliatory weapons that would invite the one war no one is willing to fight. Our antagonist can use threats of force successfully because, on the one hand, he has seen in Indochina, Hungary and now in Egypt the essential emptiness of a policy of massive retaliation. On the other hand, he knows the downgrading of conventional weapons has enfeebled American foreign policy in the one sphere where in practice we could risk war in order to gain peace. Ironically, one side in the conflict has retained the threat of force as an instrument of peace while the other has denied itself the principal historic means for its pursuit, i.e., effective force. By committing ourselves to absolute peace or war through absolute weapons, we seem to be inviting the very holocaust our pacifism passionately seeks to avoid.

The supreme irony of a foreign policy based on abstract principles alone is seen when we consider anti-colonialism as a guide to action. The wellspring

of American opposition to colonialism is an historic concern with the dignity of the individual and the right of every society to work out its own destiny through the consent of the governed. While Europe shares America's convictions on the ends inherent in this concept, it has differing views as to the necessary means. These differences are perhaps less significant than the discovery that colonialism or anti-colonialism in practice is not an end in itself. Beyond both conceptions is the ideal of people living by the consent of the governed. If we think of the issue in this way, the debate takes on new criteria. Whatever contributes to the goal of a people willing and able to carry on their own governance is legitimate. Frenchmen and Americans may argue whether tutelage or full independence serves this goal, but they can agree on one fundamental at least. The expansion of Soviet power into an area is bound to threaten and destroy it. For over 200 years the Russians were denied access to the Middle East by French and British power. Now by our sweeping opposition to the French and British policies on Suez we have substantially weakened their power. By weakening them we have weakened ourselves. This weakness has created a vacuum into which Soviet influence has flowed, threatening not only the interests of the West but ultimately those of newly emergent colonial states. Thus a heedless anti-colonialism, bereft of awareness of the nature of the Soviet threat, is capable of contributing inadvertently to the most ruthless colonialism men have known.

Objectives, Ends and Means

The dread disease from which American foreign policy suffers is that, while we have strong, bold visions of the ends of international life, we falter in the realm of means. *The Economist*, which sympathized with the American, not the British, posture vis-a-vis Suez observed: "The Eisenhower administration, while having a policy toward the world, has consistently lacked policies for particular parts of it." We have had attitudes, generalities and improvised maneuvers but no remedies or positive solutions, the criticism concludes. And in the present world solutions call for more than pious affirmations that we are for peace and the United Nations and against colonialism, vital as these proximate ends may be. They call for the flowering of more friendly relations with the new nations of Asia and the Middle East. But when these relations are in tension—as they often are—with our efforts to arrest Soviet expansion through concerting our power with that of old friends (with whom we have opposed tyranny in

the past) we serve no one by renouncing our national purposes and those of historic friends.

A final lesson we can draw from Europe's crisis is the need to define our own political objectives for important areas in terms that provide relevant guides to action. Peace or anti-colonialism are both too general and too contingent to be viable directives of foreign policy. In the Middle East, it should not be too difficult to state our objectives. In the interest of national security, we must prevent further Russian expansion, assure that the Suez Canal is kept open beyond blackmail by any nation, and press for a settlement of Arab-Israeli problems that will establish a status quo worth being preserved. These objectives are clearly at odds with Soviet ambitions, may be in conflict with Nasser's dreams, but run parallel to the long-term interests of both France and Britain. We and our allies have obscured this community of interests, they by acting with a reckless and unfortunate impatience, we by choosing to view our friends rather than the Russians as the real threat. We might have firmly and deliberately disassociated ourselves from their action. Instead we conducted a crusade against their mistakes while closing our eyes to "the wholly evil Russian aggression in the Middle East." Historians may record that with this act we lost the "cold war" and paved the way to a third world war. Or they may say that this was the turning point in which we discovered our own errors as well as those of our friends, abandoned a hopelessly unrealistic approach to stubborn problems which will not yield to the "grand simplifiers," and resumed our tortuous and uncertain way with those who share our hopes for a brighter day.

Kenneth W. Thompson

COMMENTS:

Reinhold Niebuhr

I welcome Dr. Thompson's illuminating report on the European reaction to recent historical events. I note that he thinks that the alliance between Europe and the USA, commonly called the "Atlantic Community," is in the process of disintegration and that among the reasons which he gives for this disintegration is the tendency of our nation to think in terms of broad principles, such as "loyalty to the United Nations" and "anti-colonialism" instead of in terms of detailed strategy. I know that Dr. Thompson is not opposed to these broad principles and I heartily agree with his criticism of our lack of discriminating strategy.

We are, for instance, generally in favor of the independence of formerly subject peoples. This means we are in general favor of "self-determination" for nations. But when one of the newly eman-

cipated nations develops imperialistic ambitions of its own, seeks to dominate the Islamic world and gets its hands on the life-line of European economy, we are not dealing with a justified "nationalism" but with a dangerous dynamism, which becomes the more dangerous to us because it has become an instrument of Russian policy just at a time when Russian power is in the process of decay in eastern Europe. I am all for following Dr. Thompson's advice and regard it as the chief desideratum of this powerful nation, that it wield its power with a full realization of all the strategic problems in every part of the world upon which its power impinges. This is the more important since strategic failures cannot be obscured by the principle of loyalty to the United Nations. For the United Nations without a strong Anglo-American core of power becomes a rudderless ship. Indeed, it has become such a ship in recent weeks.

M. Searle Bates

Dr. Thompson's excellent article, which commands a high degree of assent, is legitimately centered upon European relationships with emphasis on the Communist menace. He denominates the objectives and preferences of American policy as peace, the United Nations, and living by the consent of the governed. But he does not seem to allow that just those three goals or factors required prompt collective repudiation of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, which was destructive of the United Nations and calculated to force upon one member the will of two members—however much the latter were provoked.

American policy and procedure have been uncertain and clumsy. Our officials need, for their own good and for understanding both here and abroad, to restate from time to time their overall principles as the frame in which particular decisions are expounded. Thus, protection and development of the non-Communist world demanded reaffirmation of the United Nations against the grievous error at Suez, *in order that* a broad front, including Britain and France, can be restored. The confidence of secondary countries in non-communist Europe was shaken when their security and their fuel were risked by others without consultation. Arabs and their numerous sympathizers had to be assured instantly that there was no revival of the old imperialism to which they are excessively sensitized by generations of resentments. The Latin-American states can at any moment swing sharply against a threat by powerful nations to the independence of weaker ones, and are historically conditioned to suspect the United States in this regard.

In sum, if the United States showed more concern to protect the British and French than to maintain the essential principle of self-rule, there would be no widespread cooperation of non-Communist states and perhaps no continuance of the United Nations. Certainly the banner of peace, the United Nations, and anti-colonialism would have been seized by the Russians, with the enthusiastic ap-

plause of many and the despairing approval of some who could find no suitable alignment with power. Only a broad base of respect for national life by consent can draw hundreds of millions together in free cooperation against Communist peril; and that means consideration for the second- and third-rank states in Europe, in Afro-Asian lands, and in Latin America. In that total cooperation Britain and France are, of course, essential. Against it, they were for the moment enemies of mankind, as we also can easily be.

John C. Bennett

I think that Dr. Thompson's article is an excellent statement of a widely held position in regard to our foreign policy but it seems to me to be very one-sided so far as the immediate crisis in the Middle East is concerned. I agree fully about the importance of the Western alliance and there is no doubt that for some weeks we were needlessly graceless in the way in which we dealt with England and France. We should all acknowledge the remarkable way in which the British have prepared their colonies for self-government and have accepted the gradual liquidation of their empire.

Dr. Thompson seems to me to see the present crisis too exclusively in the context of the "cold war" and the struggle for power between Russia and the West. His strictures about a sentimental and doctrinaire anti-colonialism hardly apply to the present situation. Critics of Britain and France are not concerned in the abstract about colonialism; they are concerned about the British and French attack on Egypt as a reversion to the worst kind of colonialism. Here we saw the colonial powers strike unilaterally in their own interests against a nation which had known nearly a century of domination by one of them. This was certainly out of character for Britain and it is not surprising that a very large part of British opinion condemned the policy as much as our government did.

The Suez Canal issue as a symbol of this former Western dominance and the existence of Israel as a state in the Arab world, which, with its alien culture, was forced by the West on that world, have to be seen together. Israel's aggression was provoked but the existence of Israel has been a continuous source of provocation. The support of Israel by the British and the French greatly aggravated the offence involved in their own action. I see nothing in Dr. Thompson's very thoughtful article which indicates that he feels it very important to see the problem even a little from the point of view of Egypt and the other Arab nations. I am at a loss to understand this one-sidedness in many American experts on foreign policy.

The fact that we have an obligation to defend Israel from destruction makes it all the more important for us to take an imaginative view of the feelings and the problems of the Arab nations because it is necessary to find substantial compensation for them while we guarantee the security of Israel.

From the Arab standpoint, the creation of Israel on their soil was an act of injustice and, though it would now be a greater injustice for the nations which sanctioned the creation of Israel to sacrifice her, the nations should not deny the justice in the Arab case.

Dr. Thompson criticizes strongly the Administration's renunciation of force in this situation. He says that it is often necessary to risk war in order to prevent war. I agree fully with this principle. But we are now involved in a situation in which it is difficult to see how force can gain our ends. If we sanction the use of force against Egypt we tend to throw Egypt into the Russian camp and that would bring us the opposite of what we intend. We cannot defend any part of the world against the Russians without having the cooperation of its inhabitants and this is true in a special way when we seek to defend not only territory but oil wells and pipe lines and a canal. Dr. Thompson calls attention to a real problem when he says that the danger of total war causes us to fear to risk even a limited war but that is not the major problem in the Middle East. There it is the difficulty of having a defensible area to defend by any kind of force. If we should decide to counter-act Egypt by using Israel as a Western base, it would be self-defeating for it would increase the hostility of the Arabs whose cooperation in some areas would be essential for the defense of this area against Russia.

I think that we should welcome the fact that our Administration at long last has come to recognize the importance of the emerging Afro-Asian bloc which is, to be sure, dominated by indiscriminating anti-colonial resentments but represents half of the world's people and has become a third force with which we and the Communists must reckon. Many experts on foreign policy, including Dr. Thompson, seem to me to give insufficient attention to one factor in the "cold war" which makes it different from many power conflicts. It is the fact that one essential ingredient in Communist power is neither military nor economic but the persuasive power of an idea become propaganda. Over against this aspect of Communist power the power of the new nations, especially India, becomes very important. In terms of traditional patterns of power conflicts the power of these nations would be largely irrelevant but it is not so now. Negatively they have the power that comes from the fact that they could be drawn into the Communist camp and could become part of its power. But positively they have great moral influence which can weaken communism and they can help to negotiate settlements which will help us to gain time while Communist power, as now appears to be the case, grows weaker. Dr. Thompson in his criticism of the fallacies in an indiscriminating anti-colonialism fails to realize that a wrong move in relation to colonialism which throws the anti-colonial countries into the Communist camp or which fails to win them so that their moral power can block Communist advance may upset the real balance of power in the world as much as a wrong move in Europe in relation to the traditional forms of power.

Reply by Dr. Thompson

I should have thought that an essay on Europe's crisis ought to deal more with European than Asian problems. In one respect critics like Dr. Bennett ask for another article on a different topic. They raise the baffling but fundamental question of what America can do to win the hearts of the Arab and Asian world. They imply that the United States can achieve solidarity with the peoples of those vast areas by *not* supporting European nations. I personally doubt this is the way friendships are made. Our Middle Eastern policy of the past few weeks has been overwhelmingly negative. We have denounced, fixed guilt and passed resolutions. Yet has anyone in authority come forward with a sound American policy for peace in the Middle East? Do we see more clearly than we did what a status quo that nations would be willing and able to defend might look like? Nor will it do to leave this to the UN, for its policies are those of its most active members.

I suspect these are the issues we must face before we shall win the enduring loyalties of the new states. Idealists and isolationists have rejoiced at our recent actions: idealists because they confuse moral pronouncements and concrete policies, isolationists because by exploiting latent antagonisms toward Europe they hope to cut loose from existing commitments and dictate terms in parts of the world where our policies thus far have cost us very little. The one thing these groups have in common is their massive overestimation of Ameri-

can power. The one sees our moral power as triumphing over every obstacle while the other imagines that our physical power alone and unaided can sweep aside opposing forces.

Setting aside these illusions, there are countless large and small acts of a public and private character by which we can assure Arabs and Asians of our good will: technical aid, cultural contacts, recognition of their history, support of their legitimate national aspirations. But these acts take time which we can earn only by resisting the expansion of Russian or other tyrannies. The real and immediate threat is Russian power pouring into the vacuum left by the American-sponsored withdrawal of the French and the British. This force and not the Communist ideology undermines freedom in the Middle East, for except in the shadow of the Red Army or Russian arms, communism has been checked throughout the world. Surely sympathy for the Arabs need not blind anyone to this stubborn problem, whatever we may feel about recent methods used to resist it. For if we fail to arrest Russia's attempt to penetrate the Middle East, establish Hungarian-type colonialism and cut the lifeline of Europe, we may be driven at some later date to reckless acts, not on Arab battlefields but in a war to preserve Western civilization. This sets the framework for our proper concern with the non-Western world. Two sets of interests are in tension. Neither can be abandoned, but the dictates of national interest must guide us from case to case.

In Our Next Issue

AMOS WILDER writes on "The Church's Concern With The Arts."

"More significant today than the church's activity in connection with the ecclesiastical arts is the deeper motivation which is revolutionizing the church's whole attitude to symbolic expression . . . The historical study of Christian art has quickened, and been quickened by, the new recognition of the importance of the symbolic element in religion and life."

Detroit Public Library
Book Receiving Dept.
5201 Woodward Ave.
Detroit 2, Mich.

27462 11-57

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Bi-Weekly Journal of Christian Opinion

537 WEST 121 ST. • NEW YORK 27 • N. Y.

EDITORIAL BOARD

REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND JOHN C. BENNETT, *Chairmen*
WAYNE H. COWAN, *Managing Editor*
ARNOLD W. HEARN, *Assistant Editor*
M. SEARLE BATES WALDO BEACH AMOS WILDER
ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN F. ERNEST JOHNSON
JOSEPH SITTLER HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

JAMES C. BAKER FRANCIS P. MILLER J. OSCAR LEE
UMPHREY LEE WILLIAM F. MAY ROGER L. SHINN
KENNETH W. THOMPSON EDWARD L. PARSONS
HENRY SMITH LEIPER JOHN A. MACKAY
LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

CONTENTS

EUROPE'S CRISIS AND AMERICA'S DILEMMA
KENNETH W. THOMPSON
COMMENTS
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, M. SEARLE BATES,
JOHN C. BENNETT
REPLY
KENNETH W. THOMPSON